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ABSTRACT 
Intermediary institutions are a multi-facetted phenomenon which has taken many different 
forms in the course of social evolution. This is also being testified by the evolutionary 
trajectories from corporatism through neo-corporatism to governance in the European 
settings from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. Against this background, this chapter 
seeks to outline the key parameters of a theoretical framework suitable for approaching and 
analysing intermediary institutions. The chapter pins down five central dimensions of 
intermediary institutions. This is done under the headings: Context, Function, Evolution, 
Order, and Compatibility. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Intermediary institutions are difficult to grasp because they are always “in-between” 
something else. It is therefore hardly surprising that they are typically regarded as mere 
reflections of structures or interests located outside the institutions themselves. The objective 
of this chapter is, however, to advance an understanding of intermediary institutions as 
autonomous social phenomena which produce their own sources of social meaning, and thus 
their own forms of power and norms, thereby enabling an understanding of them as 
independent objects of study. This, of course, does not mean that the wider context within 
which intermediary institutions operate is of no relevance. As we will see and subsequently 
explore, the contrary is, in fact, the case, as “context construction” is one of the central 
contributions of intermediary institutions to society as such. This again gives intermediary 
institutions a strategic location in society, as they are one of the central sites where the 
integration of society unfolds. The reason for this is the intermediate function that they fulfil 
as channels of transfer between different societal spheres, and the kind of context 
construction which is both the result of and the condition for successful transfers. 
In the following, five central dimensions of intermediary institutions are outlined 
under the headings: Context, Function, Evolution, Order, and Compatibility. To be sure, this 
is not an exhaustive list but merely a starting-point for the endeavour of establishing a 
theoretical framework capable of grasping the phenomenon of intermediary institutions. 
2.  CONTEXT: MODERNITY NOT CAPITALISM 
In The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi (Polanyi 2011) presents us with a historical re-
construction of the increased differentiation and detachment of the processes of economic 
production from the rest of society and the institutionalisation of a specific economic logic 
which increasingly defies attempts to introduce non-economic concerns into economic 
production processes. More specifically, he dates the emergence of a modern form of 
economic production to the liberalisation of the British labour market in the 1830s (Polanyi 
2011, 84ff.). A decade before this move, Hegel had, as a contemporary observer, in his 
Philosophy of Rights (Hegel 1970), among many other things, analysed the consequences of 
the unfolding differentiation of the economy from the state in particular, and the rest of 
society in general. This diagnosis of the emerging modern society was the core reason for 
Hegel’s subsequent attempt to elevate the modern rational state into the central integrative 
structure of society upon the basis of the - at that time - novel distinction between the state 
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and society. Hegel’s attempt to understand the state as the central integrative force of modern 
society was, however, based upon a fundamental and theoretically unsatisfactory paradox, 
since the status of the state in the Hegelian construction remains essentially undetermined. 
This is the case because in the Hegelian construction the state continues to oscillate between 
being a distinct and limited social structure, and a structure which encompasses society as a 
whole. A paradox which was never resolved by Hegel or his immediate followers. 
The unsatisfactory status of the Hegelian attempt to put the state on the central 
pedestal of modernity provided the basis for Marx’ attempt to turn Hegel upside down in 
order for him to “stand on his feet”, through his insistence on seeing the forces of economic 
production, rather than the state, as the primary driver of societal change, a perspective which 
subsequently led Marxist-inspired scholarship into numerous attempts to explain the 
contradiction between economic determinism and the autonomous rationality of the state (for 
example, Poulantaz 2014). Thus, Marxist-inspired scholarship turned Hegel upside down, but 
the fundamental theoretical paradox did not disappear. In both cases, the attempt to reduce a 
single social sphere – be it the political system in the state form or the economy – to the 
central driving-force of modern society undermined the simultaneous attempt to understand 
the sphere in question as being differentiated from the rest of society. 
It follows from the above that we, as also expressed in the term “political economy”, 
can distinguish between two outlooks: One the one hand, Polanyi’s and Marx’s attempt to 
understand the core transformations of society in modernity as linked to alterations in the 
mode of economic production and the logic guiding economic processes and, on the other 
hand, the state-based Hegelian perspective which seeks to understand the central 
transformations of modern society as linked to a transformation in the internal composition of 
the political system in the state form and in the way the state structures its relations to the rest 
of society. These two outlooks have provided the central nexus upon which intermediary 
institutions have been conceptualised and analysed so far. However, both the strong focus on 
change in the structural composition of economic production, inherent to the Marxist- and 
Polanyi-inspired accounts, as well as the Hegelian focus on the state, provide a reductionist 
understanding of the processes which led to the breakthrough of modernity, and, with it, the 
emergence of new types of intermediary institutions. Not only the economy and politics in 
the state form, but also other social spheres, such as law, science, education, health, and art, 
became increasingly differentiated as part of the breakthrough of modernity. These spheres of 
society also became increasingly self-constituting, relying on their own resources of social 
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meaning, specific types of organisations, professions and social roles. In the wake of the 
Humboldtian revolution, the move towards an economy based upon the objective of 
facilitating the economy’s own continued expansion through the pursuit of profit became, for 
example, supplemented by a new type of science in which the overriding purpose of science 
was the pursuit of scientific truths. In a similar manner, under the slogan “l’art pour l’art”, or 
“art for art’s sake”, a new type of art whose sole justification was the pursuit of beauty rather 
than serving as praise to God or as an instrument of glorification for the political rulers of the 
time, emerged with the breakthrough of modernity. Thus, instead of a binary economy versus 
politics perspective, an adequate description of the modern condition implies a multi-
dimensional approach which is capable of describing and analysing the increased autonomy 
of a whole range of societal spheres as well as the multiple overlapping and tangled relations 
between them. The protracted move to modernity implied a re-configuration of society away 
from a structural dominance of stratification in the feudal form, and towards a structural 
dominance of functional differentiation as the central organising principle of society through 
the emergence of a whole range of functionally-differentiated social processes related not 
only to the economy and politics, but also to areas such as law, religion, science, intimacy, 
art, health, and education, with each of them being characterised by an orientation towards 
their own self-preservation.1 Thus, Polanyi’s historical re-construction of the differentiation 
of the modern economic system is not fundamentally wrong, but just one-sided, and, as such, 
it ultimately leads to a false diagnosis of society, because it does not take into account the co-
evolutionary and simultaneous unfolding of a plurality of processes of differentiation relating 
to several distinct social spheres. 
One of several consequences of this is that the embedded/dis-embeddedness 
problématique advanced by Polanyi is not specific to the economic sphere. The modern 
system of politics in the state form, for example, is also a dis-embedded structure. In contrast 
to pre-modern forms of rule, the modern state is not patrimonial, but is instead a systemic 
structure which is distinct and characterised by an abstract legal personality which makes it 
separate from its members. The modern sovereign state is a structure of generalised and 
impersonal rule, as its rules apply to all persons within a given territory. It is a form of rule 
which only requires a minimum of communication towards its subjects, and only in a form 
which refers to specific roles that are unfolded within specific contextual settings such as the 
quadrennial act of voting or the form-filling encounter with the bureaucratic agents of the 
state (Kjaer 2011, 87-88). In a similar manner, modern science and art are also to be 
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understood as dis-embedded phenomena. No layman or indeed even a scientist from another 
discipline has the capacity to understand what is going on in a scientific laboratory, just as 
contemporary art is produced within very small circles and only remains accessible to a small 
segment of the population. The embeddedness/dis-embeddedness problématique is, therefore, 
as also highlighted by scholars as different as Rousseau, Kirkegaard and Adorno, a general 
feature of the modern condition, rather than a phenomenon specific to the modern economy. 
Thus, together with the co-evolutionary and simultaneous emergence of a whole range of 
functionally-differentiated societal spheres, the generality of the embedded/dis-embeddedness 
problématique indicates that modernity, rather than capitalism, needs to be the central 
starting-point for theoretical reflections on the emergence and evolution of intermediary 
institutions.2 
3.  FUNCTION: INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS AS INTERFACES 
Against the above background, the status and position of intermediary institutions in modern 
society becomes somewhat clearer, in so far as their emergence can be seen as a reflection of 
processes of differentiation involving a multitude of social spheres. The original question 
posed by Hegel, which was subsequently taken up by the emerging sociological discipline 
(Habermas 1988, 34ff), was how society can remain integrated under the condition of 
functional differentiation. In feudal society, the household institution had been the central 
framework through which integration unfolded, since one of its central functions was to 
combine and stabilise relations between multiple social strata, as, for example, expressed 
through the widespread reliance on manorialism as the central organisational form in rural 
areas throughout Europe. The move towards an increased reliance upon functional 
differentiation, however, implied a breakdown of the household as the central institutional 
structure through which society was to be integrated. 
Although the conversion of European society into a largely functionally-differentiated 
society unfolded gradually through century-long processes and with substantial differences in 
intensity and speed within different areas of Europe, this development implied that the 
question of how society is integrated needed to be posed in a substantially different manner. 
The core question was no longer how a mutual stabilisation of exchanges and expectations 
between different social strata became institutionally stabilised, but rather how exchanges and 
expectations between different functionally-delineated social spheres became institutionally 
stabilised. It is this re-configuration which provides the basis for the emergence of modern 
types of intermediary institutions in so far as corporatist, neo-corporatist and governance 
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institutions share the feature that they act as interfaces between different societal spheres. 
They were - and, indeed, are - formations which bundle condensed social components, such 
as economic products and capital, political decisions, scientific knowledge, legal judgments 
and religious beliefs, which are produced within different spheres of society in order to make 
them compatible with other social spheres and to facilitate their transfer from one sphere to 
another.3 
In order to be successful, such transfers require the transformation of intermediary 
institutions into sites where shared expectations involving multiple social spheres are 
established, thereby providing these institutions with a crucial position in society, since they 
become central sites where the construction of common contexts involving multiple social 
spheres unfold. It is through a re-iterated process of successful transfer that the 
institutionalisation of shared expectations, and thus the formation of an overarching 
framework in the form of a common context, emerges.4 Intermediary institutions are, 
therefore, not just “structural couplings”. The concept of structural coupling is essentially a 
“black box” concept, and, as such, a “non-concept”.5 Furthermore, the notion of transfer 
implies that the components in question change through their transfer, in so far as what 
arrives is not identical to what was despatched, thereby indicating the autonomous dimension 
of such structures. The Luhmannian attempt to downplay the relevance of intermediary 
institutions as much as possible through their reduction to mere structural couplings, 
therefore, provides an implausible and rather simplified understanding of their centrality in 
modern society. In contrast to the Luhmannian perspective, intermediary institutions must be 
understood as autonomous social phenomena which produce their own sources of meaning 
and thus their own types of power and norms. In other words: as independent objects of 
social scientific enquiry. The acknowledgement of the independent impact and relevance of 
intermediary institutions is therefore likely to lead to a substantially different societal 
diagnosis than the one advanced by Luhmann. 
Furthermore, the context-constructing endeavour of intermediary institutions goes 
beyond the binary relationship between the economy and politics. Early forms of corporatism 
emerged in societal settings where religion played a crucial role as either a positive or 
negative marker. The differentiation of the economy implied the liberation of economic 
calculi from their embeddedness in religious belief systems, as, for example, reflected in the 
phenomenon of “just price” which became an integrated element of Catholic theology from 
Thomas Aquinas onwards. Early corporatist institutions were, therefore, in their religious 
 7 
variant, oriented towards re-integrating the economy and religion, or, in their syndicalist and 
socialist variants, explicitly oriented towards substituting religious frameworks, a move 
which was further complemented by quests towards (re-) integrating social praxis in relation 
to family, intimacy, and education, for example, in the form of vocational training, into an 
integrated framework. Thus, rather than the state/economy nexus, the economy/religion 
nexus was the central theme of early corporatism, just as the freeing of the economic logic 
from religious-induced morality probably had just as profound consequences for the re-
calibration of economic processes as the differentiation between the economy and politics. 
Early corporatism was, therefore, not so much about stabilising relations and expectations 
between politics and the economy as about the attempt towards maintaining a holistic outlook 
under the condition of fragmentation of meaning brought about by increased reliance on 
functional differentiation as the structuring principle of social processes within modern 
society. 
The move to neo-corporatism in the post-Second World War period in Western 
Europe implied a stronger equivalence between intermediary set-ups and the state, through 
the emergence of tri-partite frameworks of co-ordination between employers, employees and 
the state. This development brought economic rationality and attached social-welfare 
perspectives to the forefront, in so far as the pursuit of increases in economic well-being 
became the overriding normative point of orientation of intermediary institutions at the same 
time as a certain state-centeredness emerged, a move which implied a metamorphosis of the 
functions which it included, in so far as, within the broader framework of the emerging 
welfare-state conglomerates, a whole range of social spheres ranging from health and 
education to sport and leisure activities increasingly became integrated through the 
institutional frameworks provided by intermediary institutions.6 
The turn to governance, which has gradually unfolded from the 1980s onwards, 
implied yet another re-calibration of the central societal spheres which intermediary 
institutions combine and re-connect (Stoker 1998). This is most notably the case due to the 
increased centrality of science and science-based processes. From central banking to risk 
regulation within areas as diverse as food safety, consumer protection, and financial 
regulation, and to health prevention and environmental protection, science-based 
argumentation has increasingly gained status as the central role-model upon which the co-
ordinating and stabilising operations of governance frameworks rely (see, for example, 
Ladeur 2011). The adoption of scientific practice as the central role-model upon which 
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regulation is based was followed by claims of neutrality, objectivity and an absence of “crude 
power” within science-based frameworks. The reality, of course, looks rather different, but, at 
the same time, the institutionalisation of specific organisational forms, vocabularies and 
normative yardsticks derived from scientific modes of communication implies a 
fundamentally different approach to society than the one advanced within neo-corporatist set-
ups.7 
It follows from the above that the three types of intermediary institutions emerged and 
operated in substantially different ecological environments understood as the structuring 
contexts within which they operate and to which they faced pressure to adapt. But it also 
follows from the above that ecological environments should not be understood as referring to 
the structural dominance of a single sphere of society, but rather to configurative processes 
which are made up of combinations of different social processes.8 
4.  EVOLUTION: THE EIGENSTRUCTURES OF INTERMEDIARY 
INSTITUTIONS 
The concept of eigenstructures has been introduced into sociology by Rudolf Stichweh 
(Stichweh 2006). In his account, the concept is deployed in order to analyse the gradual 
realisation of a singular world society, and, in particular, to respond to the question of how 
increasingly global social processes cope with the high level of cultural diversity 
characterising the world. Eigenstructures are understood by Stichweh as structural patterns 
which simultaneously re-produce pre-existing forms of social diversity while increasingly 
marginalising such pre-existing diversity through the creation of new types of social 
structures. Thus, the thrust of the concept of eigenstructures is that it enables an analysis of 
social structures upon the basis of a cumulative model of social change, in which new 
structures emerge without existing structures disappearing, thereby leading to a layering and 
continued co-existence of different social formations. The types of social structures which 
Stichweh focuses upon are function systems, such as the global economy, globalised mass-
media and the system of world politics, formal organisations, networks, epistemic 
communities, and world events such as revolutions and the Olympic Games. Common to 
these otherwise very different types of social structures is the fact that they have emerged and 
gradually become globalised types of social structures and simultaneously acquire quite 
specific features in different contexts. A second characteristic is that they emerged in the 
form of metamorphoses from within already existing social structures. A classic example of 
such processes is the emergence of modern statehood in Europe which emerged gradually 
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over century-long processes from within existing feudal orders. In Norbert Elias’ classical 
analysis of the emergence of the modern French state, for example, the increased 
organisational complexity and spatial reach of the French monarchy led to the gradual 
century-long emergence of a new type of nobility, the noblesse de robe (nobility of the gown) 
or “civil servant nobility”, which represented the bureaucratic structure of the emerging 
modern state. A kind of nobility which gradually marginalised the classical noblesse d'épée 
(nobility of the sword), thereby undermining the very structure of a nobility-based society 
while taking on the credentials of nobility itself. The noblesse de robe gradually gained the 
form of an eigenstructure with a fundamentally different composition and orientation to the 
pre-existing structures from which it grew out of, while it, in its own process of 
differentiation, continued to rely on and refer to these pre-existing structures (Elias 1976). 
Thus, the breakthrough of modernity, which was the long-term consequence of this 
development, contemporaneously represented both a fundamental break with and a perfect 
continuation of the existing social formations. 
The distinction between fundamental break and perfect continuation also seems to fit 
the evolutionary trajectories of intermediary institutions in their corporatist, neo-corporatist 
and governance versions. Corporatist institutions emerged from within pre-existing feudal 
set-ups, and, to a large extent, implied a continuation of pre-modern social praxis. 
Furthermore, post-Second World War neo-corporatism implied both a fundamental break 
with and a continuation of classical forms of corporatism, just as contemporary forms of 
governance can be seen as both relying on and simultaneously marginalising neo-corporatist 
set-ups. In all three cases, we are also dealing with processes of metamorphosis in which the 
question of handling the tension between increases in spatial reach and the compatibility with 
pre-existing forms of social diversity is at the forefront. 
Corporatist institutions emerged from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards 
and maintained their vigour until the middle of the twentieth century. In the same period, a 
multi-faceted, but nonetheless distinct, body of corporatist social thought emerged, and what, 
for example, Catholic, socialist, syndicalist and fascist forms of corporatist thinking all 
shared or held in common, was a holistic approach (Wiarda 1997). And these various 
approaches shared the objective of (re-) establishing institutional arrangements that were to 
be capable of (re-) integrating the social practices of economic production with, for example, 
religious and family-based structures, as well as a wide range of other social functions 
relating to areas such as education, policing and health. Such an approach was, for example, 
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consciously advanced by Pope Leo XIII (Wiarda 1997). As such, the emergence of 
corporatist structures can, as already indicated, be understood as a reaction against the 
increased differentiation of the economic sphere and the concordant breakdown of holistic 
universes of meaning in the emerging modern society. In consequence, it was common to 
most forms of corporatist thinking that they possessed a “reactionary” dimension. Yet, rather 
than possessing a simple, one-dimensional reactionary character, corporatist institutions 
fulfilled a dual modernising and stabilising function for society. They acted internally to 
stabilise new forms of economic processes which were characterised by an increase in the 
division of labour, the establishment of monopolistic structures, the ramification of quasi-
feudal stratified orders of social class, and by the institutionalisation of collective wage 
bargaining. At the same time, corporate institutions were oriented towards the establishment 
of compatibility with other increasingly functionally-delineated segments of society, which 
possessed, for example, a political or religious character. In consequence, corporatist 
institutions can be understood as structures which simultaneously fortified and transformed 
the existing institutions. 
By the late nineteenth century, this sort of early corporatism was a particularly strong 
characteristic of the part of Europe where modern statehood had not materialised or where 
modern statehood had not yet found a stable form or a sufficient level of abstraction to enable 
it to deploy a de-personalised form of power in a coherent manner across its social space. 
This was most notably the case in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Southern Europe. 
Thus, in practice, the early forms of corporatist institutions were not national institutions, but 
were, instead, localistic institutions which typically were centred on or around a city and its 
immediate catchment area. As such, they were, to large extent, re-articulations of already 
existing feudal guild-based institutions. Furthermore, the fact that they maintained their 
relevance and centrality far into the twentieth century indicates that modern statehood did not 
materialise in a large part of Europe before sometime in the mid-twentieth century. The 
perspective advanced by Schmitter and Lembruch (Schmitter and Lembruch 1979) that early 
forms corporatism was essentially state-centred is, therefore, based upon a false conception of 
what modern statehood implies. Modern statehood rests, as also expressed in the state and 
society distinction, on a separation of the state from the rest of society. The contexts where 
early forms of corporatism gained most ground were, however, only to a limited degree 
characterised by such types of statehood, but were, instead, dominated by quasi-privatistic 
and highly instable forms of rule which lacked the institutional stability which characterises 
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modern statehood. This was also the case for the totalitarian regimes of the early twentieth 
century. As pointed out by Franz Neumann, totalitarianism did not imply “strong statehood”, 
but, rather, the dissolution of statehood and its replacement by highly obscure, essentially 
privatised forms of arbitrary violence (Neumann 1983, 467ff), a form of violence which 
gained in intensity, when compared with earlier feudal set-ups, due to the ability of such 
privatistic power structures to rely on modern forms of organisation (Bauman 1989), thereby 
highlighting the character of totalitarian regimes as transitional phenomena which thrived in 
the twilight between feudality and modernity. 
The emergence of European neo-corporatism in the post-1945 period also took the 
dual form of a real-life phenomenon and a distinct body of social thought (see, for example, 
Schmitter and Lembruch 1979). In practice, neo-corporatism took the form of complex 
negotiation systems (Wilke 1992), which relied on highly-centralised peak-organisations. The 
organisational form of neo-corporatism was thus fundamentally different from the 
continuation of feudal types of organisation upon which earlier forms of corporatism had 
relied. The core characteristic of both, however, remained the dual function of the internal 
stabilisation and external compatibility of economic processes, as outlined above. Neo-
corporatist structures internally frame the relationship between employers and employees not 
only in relation to wage bargaining, but also in relation to general working conditions. As 
such, the core function of neo-corporatism is very closely-related to the question of the 
maintenance of stability in the economic system. Although great regional variations can be 
observed, the task of internal ordering has, in many cases, been extended to functions such as 
the organisation of education, the administration of unemployment benefits, health and safety 
at work, and also, in some national settings, most notably Germany, workforce participation 
in management through work councils and co-determination. At the peak level, tri-partism 
between the state, employers and employees emerged as a central form of (economic) policy 
co-ordination between the state and neo-corporatist institutions in the post-war period. Both 
internal ordering in the economic sphere, and the stabilisation of relations between the 
economy and other spheres of society, thereby became prominent aspects of neo-corporatism. 
The heyday of neo-corporatism only lasted for a couple of decades, in the time of Les 
Trente Glorieuses and the Wirtschaftswunder. This period was characterised by exceptional 
congruence between not only the economy, law and politics, but also the mass media, 
education and culture within the framework of national configurations, thereby providing the 
foundational impetus for the myth of the golden age of the nation state (Hurrelmann et al. 
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2007), a national framework which, however, most notably through the launch of the 
European integration process in the 1950s, came under sustained pressure at the very moment 
in which it came into being. Thus, the immediate dissolution of the state-centric society in the 
moment of its realisation might be considered to be the tragic fate of modern statehood 
(Thornhill 2011). 
Governance, a phenomenon that emerged in the 1980s against the background of the 
steering and planning crises of the 1970s (Mayntz 2003; Mayntz 2006) and which has 
continued its expansion ever since, implies a dual move: a re-calibration of the organisation 
of economic production and its relations to the rest of society, and a dispersion of political 
power to an increased number of not only national, but also transnational, sites of power, a 
move which has led to increased incongruence between societal structures and the normative 
grid upon which it relies (Stoker 1998; Walker 2008). 
In relation to the first dimension, a move can be observed towards a firm- or sector-
specific internalisation of the functions originally associated with corporatism and neo-
corporatism through the emergence of complex intra- and inter-firm co-ordination and 
control mechanisms, and thus internal bodies of (legal) norms. Four dimensions can be 
distinguished in this process. These are: the establishment of internal coherence between 
mother companies and subsidiaries, and the framing of relations between the employers and 
employees operating within them; the co-ordination of increasingly-complex supply- and 
distribution-chains involving a large number of different firms; industry-wide collaboration 
via trade associations and self-regulatory arrangements; the establishment of compatibility 
with the non-economic spheres through, for example, corporate social responsibility and 
lobbying frameworks. Also in this first dimension, a reduction of (nation) state-centeredness, 
in relation to the establishment of compatibility with the segments of society which are 
external to the economic system, can be observed. Lobbying, for example, is increasingly 
oriented towards non-state political structures such as the European Union and the World 
Trade Organization. Even more fundamentally, partnerships are increasingly being 
established directly between companies and their non-political environment, through 
stabilised relations with scientific and educational institutions and environmental groups. 
This development creates novel links which circumvent the binary relationship between the 
economy and politics at the same time as the dual function concerning internal stability and 
external compatibility remains at the forefront. 
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In the second dimension, the emergence and increased importance of transnational 
political regimes such as the EU, the OECD, the IMF and the WTO implies the emergence of 
new types of intermediary institutions such as Comitology and the Open Method Co-
ordination (OMC), which are partly induced by states running in parallel with the regimes 
induced by multinational companies and NGOs, and partly serve as hybrid forms operating 
in-between the two dimensions. What is common to the two dimensions, however, is that 
they are focused on transfer and compatibility in a world characterised by cultural and 
organisational diversity. Comitology, the implementation committees of the EU, for example, 
serves not only as an interface through which the transfer of legislative acts from the EU legal 
order to Member State legal orders unfold, but also as sites in which a common 
understanding of the implications of the legislative acts in question are developed in the face 
of substantial linguistic, legal, political and socio-economic differences (Joerges and Neyer 
1997). 
Finally, the two types of governance share the feature that they reflect spatial 
expansions through the establishment of European-wide - as well as increasingly global - 
frameworks. A central driving force for the switches between corporatism through neo-
corporatism to governance seems to be this expansion in reach. But, at the same time, this 
development does not imply eradication, but merely a marginalisation of previous forms of 
intermediary institutions. Local networks derived from early corporatism have retained their 
vigour in areas such as southern Germany and Northern Italy (Crouch et al. 2004), just as 
neo-corporatist networks, most notably in Germany, have successfully reformed and adapted 
in recent times, thereby constituting a multi-spatial world characterised by several 
overlapping forms of ordering.9 
5.  ORDER: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOCIETAL CONGLOMERATES 
THROUGH INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS 
As already indicated, early forms of corporatism combined, among others, religious, political, 
legal and economic dimensions: neo-corporatism, politics, law, the economy, health and 
education, and contemporary governance institutions, to a large extent, all serve as interfaces 
between politics, science, law and the economy. The sort of “higher order” which emerges is, 
therefore, substantially different in relation to the three types of intermediary institutions. 
The type of orders which, in layman’s terms, are understood as nation states is the 
clearest example of such orders. Rather than being singular orders imposed by the state, they 
are complex configurations, consisting of a whole range of functional sub-systems, regimes, 
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organisations, networks, professions, and more or less intangible cultural components, all of 
which relate to each order in a multitude of ways. Such configurations are characterised by a 
dense web of mutually-reinforcing overlapping relations within a limited section of world 
society, which establish a convergence of expectations between multiple observers. As such, 
they produce a kind of localised “higher order”, which cannot be reduced to the sum of its 
components. Instead, they have the character of autonomous universes which, to a large 
extent, constitute the social reality of the individuals that inhabit them.10 
Legal and political sub-systems clearly enjoy an important position within such 
configurations because their central societal function is to ensure the compatibilisation of the 
time structures of such configurations (Luhmann 1993 p. 429) But this does not mean that 
such configurations merely represent the sum of the legal and the political systems, or that 
they can be understood as structures in which other societal structures are succumbed to the 
primacy of the political-legal complex. A configurational web does not constitute unity in a 
substantialist sense, and no singular and holistic state-embedded national culture exists. 
Instead, it is possible to observe a multitude of mutually-reinforcing, overlapping and thus 
intertwined cultures in the form of, for example, national legal cultures, national political 
cultures, national science cultures, and – within the economy – the specific social praxis of 
“doing business”. Apart from serving as reservoirs of knowledge, and thus as a basis for 
learning, such cultures also act as a sort of internal environment of the respective functional 
systems, in the sense that they frame the horizons which are taken into account in the 
continued selection of their operations, thereby serving as stabilisation mechanisms which 
reduce the volatility of societal reproduction. They rely upon fictional semantics, in the form 
of, for example, foundational myths and the social constructions of languages, traditions and 
“vested interests”, which are specific to each sphere of society. They are abstract 
constructions, or, in Hegelian terms, “second natures” (Hegel 1970 § 4) which, nonetheless, 
remain “real”, in the sense that they have real effects in terms of which forms of 
communications are selected (Mascareño 2008). They serve as frames for the production of 
societal trust within their respective societal spheres, and, as such, provide a contribution to 
the internal stability of such structures, in the sense that they tend to reduce volatility. 
Whereas functional systems, in their core, operate upon the basis of clear-cut system 
boundaries and accordant internal density, system cultures are far more fluid and overlapping, 
and, as such, far less dense, thereby establishing a high level of inter-systemic entangledness 
(Kjaer 2011). 
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The reality of configurational webs is mainly established at the level of organisations 
and regimes. Thus, modern society is, to a large extent, an “organisational society”. Formal 
organisation is the form through which internal order is established within functionally-
delineated areas, just as they, in their turn, serve as the “contact points” for inter-systemic 
exchange through intermediary institutions. The consequence is that a particular form of 
second order politics can be observed. The internal form of ordering within functional 
spheres becomes a question which is channelled into formalised organisational arrangements 
which produce collectively-binding decisions or the functional equivalents to collective 
decisions within their respective functional areas. It follows that successful configurations 
neither operate upon the basis of a total subordination of society to political rationality, nor in 
a form in which the political only resides in the state in the narrow sense. Instead, a certain 
gradualisation of the political can be observed, in the sense that some linkages between the 
state-based form of the political and secondary forms remain tighter than others, just as the 
internal degree of hierarchy within the secondary forms differs from societal area to societal 
area (Teubner 2012, p 114ff). 
Against this background, the configurations of the golden-age nation-state might, after 
all, and, albeit not in a holistic sense, be understood as phenomena which possess the 
possibility of self-governance, since the dense webs of mutually-reinforcing and overlapping 
relations within a limited section of world society establishes the experience of a singular 
form of order when approached by the single individual.11 In this sense, they might also be 
characterised as societies since, in the words of Talcott Parsons, “the most general function of 
a societal community is to articulate a system of norms with a collective organization that has 
unity and cohesiveness” (Parsons 1971, p. 11),12 a form of unity and cohesiveness which, 
however, has increasingly been lost with the emergence of a wide number of transnational 
configurational webs which have progressively gained the character of forms of ordering in 
their own right. 
6.  COMPATIBILITY: INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS IN A MULTI-
SPATIAL WORLD 
The emergence of a large number of competing sites of ordering outside national 
configurations implies a change in orientation for intermediary institutions. Neo-corporatist 
institutions are mainly serving as components of intra-configurational webs. Contemporary 
forms of governance are more inter-configurational in nature, in so far as they often serve as 
interfaces between different configurational orders in the multi-spatial world. 
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In this external form, governance institutions can be understood as referring to 
institutional frameworks which are located in-between different normative orders, and which 
serve the function of enabling the transfer of condensed social components between such 
orders, without this leading to the emergence of higher orders or holistic semantics. In the 
European Union context, Comitology and the Open Method of Co-ordination frameworks 
are, as mentioned above, examples of such structures, in that they are oriented towards the 
channelling of condensed social components between the legal order of the EU and the 
Member State legal orders, as well as between the legal orders of the individual Member 
States. 
The successfulness of such governance structures is highly dependent on the degree to 
which they themselves become epistemic communities which are structured around a shared 
objective. Such communities are only likely to emerge, however, if they are capable of 
developing a sense of “cultural sensibility” which enables them to take account of more or 
less intangible cultural differences within the different settings that they themselves bring 
together. As such, their central function is to establish increased compatibility between 
different forms of ordering. The multitude of Corporate Social Responsibility partnerships 
between, on the one hand, multi-nationals, and, on the other, state bureaucracies, public and 
private international organisations, research institutes, and non-governmental organisations 
fulfil a similar function for multi-national companies (Kjaer 2009). 
Governance frameworks thus become reflexivity-increasing instruments aimed at 
enhancing the capacity of observation and thereby the potential level of adaptability vis-à-vis 
developments unfolding in the social environments of these orders. But, at the same time, 
they maintain their function as the channels of diffusion through which the social 
components, such as the products, capital, legal acts, political decisions, and human 
resources, all produced by these entities are diffused into the wider society. They are double-
edged structures which simultaneously serve as adaptation mechanisms and as “tools of 
colonisation”. One of the many consequences of this is that the “ownership” of governance 
frameworks is characterised by systematic uncertainty. They function as the “neutral ground” 
where different orders engage, and this means that the ownership question tends to be a 
taboo. As epistemic ramification of this is a structural condition for operationability, and, 
because most governance structures are characterised by an asymmetric distribution of 
resources and capabilities among those participating, discursive hegemony remains a 
permanent threat. In many cases, a limited section of participants will tend to dominate, 
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thereby making governance structures into one-way streets. Making this explicit through a 
declaration of hegemony is, however, likely to undermine such set-ups. Governance 
structures tend to be characterised by organised hypocrisy, since the illusion of equality has 
to be maintained. In less-asymmetric settings - for example, due to the existence of an 
elaborate set of legal safeguards aimed at reducing the impact of asymmetric relations - self-
delusion tends to reign, in the sense that everyone involved tends to believe that he or she is 
in control. 
In this sense, contemporary governance institutions might also be understood as “in-
between worlds” (Amstutz 2005), since they are inter-contextual structures which are aimed 
at achieving an increase in the reflexivity, and thus the adaptability, of the entities which they 
link at the same time as they serve as dissemination channels for these entities. They are 
complex matrixes in which the components derived from a multiplicity of societal structures 
and contexts are combined. They are co-ordinating structures which stand transversal to the 
forms of differentiation and conflict which characterise contemporary society. 
7.  CONCLUSION 
The “turn to governance” over the past decades indicates a profound change in the set-up and 
self-understanding of European society. But, at the same time, no fundamental clarity seems 
to have emerged concerning the long-term consequences of this development. If the “turn to 
governance” is viewed in a long-term perspective, it does, however, become clear that this 
turn is not the first of its sort. Ever since the breakthrough of modernity, the question 
concerning the conditions for the continued integration of society has been a central theme, 
just as intermediary institutions have played a central role in achieving this task through their 
stabilisation of exchanges between different societal spheres. 
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1  The move towards an increased reliance on functional differentiation emerged hand in hand with new types 
of stratification in the form of social classes of the industrial society and with a new type of territorial 
differentiation within the nation state form. See Kjaer, 2014a, p. 20ff. 
2  For similar conclusions derived from a constitutional micro-perspective, see the contribution of Grahame F. 
Thompson, Chapter 10 in this volume. 
3  For the concept of transfer, see Stichweh 2005. 
4  For a theoretical elaboration of the relationship between re-iteration and context construction, see Kjaer 
2006, especially 70ff. 
5  For the most systematic attempt to investigate the implications of the concept to date, see the contributions 
in: Febbrajo and Harste 2013. 
6  For more on this, see also the contribution of Gert Verschragen, Chapter 7, in this volume. 
7  The increased reliance on science or the increased attempt to mimic the structure of scientific discourse is 
also apparent within normative political and legal theory. See, for example, Habermas 1992, where the 
scientific discourse is seen as the role model for political consensus building. 
8  For the concept of ecological environments, see, also, the contribution of Bob Jessop, Chapter 2 in this 
volume. 
9  This section built on Kjaer 2014b. 
10  This is also one of the central insights of the varieties of capitalism approach, although this approach remains 
reductionist in nature, to the extent that it only takes account of the economy and politics, and leaves out 
areas such as science and religion. See Hall and Soskice 2001. 
11  Going in a somewhat similar direction: Wilke 2006, p 34. See, also, the contribution of Richard Münch, 
Chapter 3 in this volume. 
12  Italics in original. 
